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It is recommendable to consider the distinction 
between the ‘arithmetical’ and ‘geometrical’ 
intuition not according to the moments of the 
spatial and temporal, but with a view to the 
difference between what is discrete and what is 
continuous.2
Abstract 
Systematic perspectives on diverging mathematical 
orientations 
The popular view that mathematics is “objective” and “neutral” 
in the sense that it does not know different standpoints is 
contradicted by the factual state of modern mathematics. In the 
light of the dominant one-sided trends in the history of mathe-
matics, fluctuating between arithmeticism and a geometrisation 
of this discipline, this article explores some provisional starting-
points for a different view. This third option is explored by 
investigating some features of an acknowledgement of the 
                                      
1 I want to thank two mathematicians – Proff. B. de la Rosa and H. Bargenda – 
for many valuable suggestions made during thorough-going discussions of the 
text of an earlier version of this article. 
2 “Es empfiehlt sich, die Unterscheidung von ‘arithmetischer’ und ‘geometrischer’ 
Anschauung nicht nach den Momenten des Räumlichen und Zeitlichen, 
sondern im Hinblick auf den Unterschied des Diskreten und Kontinuierlichen 
vorzunehmen” (Bernays, 1976:81) . 
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uniqueness of number and space without neglecting the inter-
aspectual connections between these two modal functions. An 
argument is advanced regarding the inevitability of employing 
analogical (or elementary) basic concepts, and this perspective 
is articulated in terms of the theory of modal aspects. Numerical 
and spatial terms are discussed and eventually focused on a 
deepened understanding of the meaning of infinity. In addition 
to a brief look at the circularity present in the arithmeticist claim 
that mathematics could be fully arithmetised (Grünbaum), 
attention is also asked for the agreement between Aristotle and 
Cantor regarding the nature of continuity – assessed in terms of 
the irreducibility of the numerical and spatial aspects of reality. 
Finally a characterisation is given of the ontological assumpt-
ions of intuitionism and axiomatic formalism. 
Opsomming 
Sistematiese perspektiewe op uiteenlopende wiskundige 
oriënterings 
Die populêre opvatting dat die wiskunde “objektief” en “neutraal” 
is in die sin dat dit geen standpuntverskille impliseer nie, word 
weerspreek deur die feitelike stand van sake in die moderne 
wiskunde. In die lig van die dominante eensydige strominge in 
die geskiedenis van die wiskunde wat gefluktueer het tussen 
die aritmetisisme en ’n geometrisering van hierdie dissipline, 
belig hierdie artikel enkele aanknopingspunte vir ’n derde opsie. 
Hierdie derde opsie word aangepak deur sommige eienskappe 
van die erkenning van die uniekheid van getal en ruimte te 
ondersoek, sonder om die intermodale skakels tussen hierdie 
twee aspekte te verwaarloos. ’n Beredeneringslyn word 
ontwikkel ten opsigte van die onvermydelike gebruik van 
analogiese (of elementêre) grondbegrippe en hierdie perspek-
tief word dan geartikuleer in terme van die teorie van modale 
aspekte. Getals- en ruimteterme word bespreek en uiteindelik 
toegespits op ’n verdiepte verstaan van die sin van die 
oneindige. Bykomend tot ’n oorsigtelike weergawe van die 
redes waarom ’n onhoudbare sirkelredenasie opgesluit lê in die 
vermeende aritmetisering van die wiskunde (Grünbaum), word 
ook aandag gevra vir die ooreenkoms en verskil tussen 
Aristoteles and Cantor aangaande die aard van kontinuïteit – 
beoordeel in terme van die onherleidbaarheid van die getals- en 
ruimteaspekte van die werklikheid. Ten slotte word die in-
tuïsionistiese wiskunde en die aksiomatiese versamelingsleer 
getipeer aan die hand van hul onderskeie ontologiese 
vooronderstellings. 
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1. Introductory remark 
It is a widely accepted and popular conviction that mathematics is an 
exact science that represents the acme of sound reasoning. 
Although there may be differences of opinion regarding diverging 
views of mathematics (or philosophies of mathematics), this popular 
view holds that intrinsically mathematics is objective and neutral. 
In his work on Zeno’s Paradoxes Salmon, for example, merely refers 
to “intuitionistic philosophers of mathematics” – without acknowledg-
ing the truly mathematical character of this trend in 20th century 
mathematics (see Salmon, 2001:23 – he refers to Körner’s work The 
Philosophy of Mathematics, 1968). By contrast, Stegmüller 
(1970:331) remarks:  
The special character of intuitionistic mathematics is expressed 
in a series of theorems that contradict the classical results. For 
instance, while in classical mathematics only a small part of the 
real functions are uniformly continuous, in intuitionistic 
mathematics the principle holds that any function that is 
definable at all is uniformly continuous. 
Beth (1965:89) also highlights this point:  
It is clear that intuitionistic mathematics is not merely that part of 
classical mathematics which would remain if one removed 
certain methods not acceptable to the intuitionists. On the 
contrary, intuitionistic mathematics replaces those methods by 
other ones that lead to results which find no counterpart in 
classical mathematics. 
One may also mention Hilbert’s appreciation of Cantor’s transfinite 
number theory – expressed in his remark that no one will ever drive 
us out of the paradise created by Cantor (Hilbert, 1925:170), and 
contrasting it with the intuitionist Heyting who disqualified transfinite 
number theory as a phantasm (Heyting, 1949:4). 
If it is therefore true that the discipline of mathematics has not 
escaped from an inner split, manifest in diverging orientations, the 
basic (philosophical) problem is: how is it possible to explain 
opposing orientations within this basic scholarly discipline?  
In our analyses below it will be attempted to provide an answer to 
this question. 
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2. Basic structural features 
The view of Bernays quoted at the beginning of the article actually 
captures the entire history of mathematics, because alternative 
views on the relationship of discreteness and continuity resulted in 
diverging systematic orientations.  
In a preceding article on “Primitive terms in mathematics” (cf. 
Strauss, 2005a:515-534) the following aspects have been discussed 
briefly: 
 
• The role of key terms – such as order, succession, induction, 
infinity (endlessness), at once, wholeness (totality), the whole-
parts relation and (infinite) divisibility.  
• In addition to the basic role of multiplicity within logic (and 
mathematics) the connection with basic concepts such as 
constants and variables was also highlighted.  
• It has been argued that the various disciplines do have to account 
for the sense in which they employ their basic concepts. It turned 
out that this issue is intimately connected to the primitive terms 
encountered within scholarly disciplines.  
• An alternative way to look at these foundational problems is to 
relate them to the problem of unity and diversity. It concerns the 
way in which an account is given of the coherence of 
irreducibiles.  
The mathematician Rucker emphasises the same intuition as the 
one highlighted by Bernays: “The discrete and continuous represent 
fundamentally different aspects of the mathematical universe” 
(Rucker, 1982:243). Moore expands the context of these 
considerations by discerning two “clusters” of concepts that 
dominate the history of the notion of infinity.  
• In the first cluster the following terms are found: “boundlessness; 
endlessness; unlimitedness; immeasurability; eternity; that which 
is such that, given any determinate part of it, there is always more 
to come; that which is greater than any assignable quantity” 
(Moore, 1990:1). 
• Within the second cluster he captures terms like completeness; 
wholeness; unity; universality; absoluteness; perfection; self-
sufficiency; autonomy (Moore, 1990:1-2). 
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These characterisations are congruent with the weak spot alluded to 
by Fraenkel et al. – regarding the “the gap between discrete and 
continuous” (Fraenkel et. al., 1973:212-213). On the previous page 
these authors present a stronger formulation:  
Bridging the gap between the domains of discreteness and of 
continuity, or between arithmetic and geometry, is a central, 
presumably even the central problem of the foundation of 
mathematics (Fraenkel et al., 1973:211)3.  
Although this formulation is consistent with the history of the 
problem – that has explored the one-sided extremes of reducing 
number to space or reducing space to number – it will turn out that a 
fruitful alternative will have to do two important things:  
• acknowledge the difference between discreteness and continuity; 
and   
• holding on to the mutual inter-connectedness of both of these 
perspectives. 
An attempt to explore this alternative approach, however, requires 
distinctions that are not known within the distinct scholarly 
disciplines. The guiding perspective that is required is found in an 
analysis of the analogical basic concepts employed by the various 
disciplines. What is truly remarkable in this context is that although it 
is not acknowledged as such, every academic discipline implicitly or 
explicitly has to use basic (analogical) concepts. 
3. The inevitability of employing analogical elementary 
basic concepts 
The contemporary fad of postmodernism explores language as 
horizon, but in doing that it does not sufficiently distinguish between 
two basic kinds of analogies, namely between (i) entitary analogies 
and (ii) modal analogies.4 Ordinary and scientific language 
designate analogies between entities with metaphors (such as the 
foot of the mountain or the wave theory of light). Whereas such 
                                      
3 In her discussion of set theory as a foundation for mathematics Maddy prefers 
to follow in the footsteps of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatisation of mathematics 
(see Maddy, 1997:14, 39 ff., 47 ff.). 
4 For a more detailed analysis of the similarities and differences between 
analogical basic concepts and metaphors as well as the foundational position of 
concept formation in relation to lingual signs (words), see Strauss (2005b:1-20). 
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metaphors (entitary analogies) could be replaced by entirely 
different ones, the substitution of modal analogies is only meaningful 
if synonomous terms are employed. A spatial term such as domain, 
for example, could be replaced by others, such as range, scope or 
sphere. Although, for technical purposes, mathematicians may 
decide to attach slightly different connotations to these different 
terms they all still share a generic spatial meaning that cannot be 
denied. In order to understand what is involved in the use of truly 
analogical basic concepts, the classical legacy concerning the 
infinite divisibility of continuity is particularly instructive.  
• Mathematical space and physical space 
In an article commemorating the centenary of Karl Weierstrass 
(published in 1925), Hilbert looks at this issue from the perspective 
of the infinitely small and the infinitely large (Hilbert, 1925:163 ff.). 
The discovery of quanta of energy on the one hand, and Einstein’s 
theory of relativity, on the other hand, eliminates both possibilities. A 
more extensive explanation is found in his oration on Naturerkennen 
und Logik (Hilbert, 1930:380-381).  
In order to account for the discrete nature of the omission or 
absorbtion of energy, Planck postulated that radiant energy is 
quantised, proportional to the frequency v in the formula E = hnv – 
where n is an integer, v the frequency, and h the quantum of action 
(Wirkungsquantum) with the value 6.624 x 10-34. This postulation 
implies that one has to distinguish between mathematical space on 
the one hand, and physical space on the other. Whereas 
mathematical space – in a purely abstract and functional perspective 
– is both continuous and infinitely divisible, physical space is neither 
continuous nor infinitely divisible. Bound to the quantum structure of 
energy, physical space cannot be subdivided ad infinitum. Energy 
quanta indeed represent the limit of the divisibility of energy.5
This example demonstrates that an analogy is found whenever 
differences are shown in what is similar. In the case of our example 
one can easily observe that both mathematical space and physical 
space are extended (their similarity). Yet, in being discontinuous and 
not infinitely divisible (the differences between them) the latter is not 
the same as the former. 
                                      
5 Owing to gravitation (“curved space”) the universe is considered to be finite 
although unbounded. 
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Our concept of physical space is an instance of an analogical basic 
concept. This basic concept accounts for the fact that within the 
structure of the physical aspect, the meaning of space is 
analogically reflected. The multiplicity of properties combined in the 
unity of a (logical) concept, in turn, analogically reflects the meaning 
of number (the one and the many) within the logical-analytical 
aspect of reality. In general, each aspect of reality expresses its 
coherence with the other aspects through analogical moments such 
as these. 
The Dutch philosopher, Herman Dooyeweerd, created a unique 
theory of “modal law-spheres” in order to explain this complex state 
of affairs. The classical distinction between properties and entities 
runs parallel to that between function and entity.6 The basic idea is 
that entities function within the various aspects of reality. 
 
• Nominalistic assumptions 
For an understanding of different mathematical orientations this 
perspective is indeed decisive. The long-standing metaphysical 
legacy of the West after the Renaissance, in what is known as its 
nominalistic trends, denies the reality (i.e. ontic existence) of these 
aspects of reality. Every form of universality (universals) is 
considered to be mere modes of thought. Since Descartes this 
nominalistic assumption7 accompanied the understanding of 
                                      
6 In Cassirer (1953) a significant contribution to an understanding of this issue is 
found. Frequently concepts of function are also designated as concepts of 
relation (“Relationsbegriffe”). 
7 The classical realist position in philosophy accepts a threefold existence of the 
so-called “universalia”: ante rem in God’s mind (the legacy of Plato’s 
transcendent ideal forms), in re within things (a la Aristotle – as their universal 
substantial forms), and post rem (as subjective universal concepts – with as 
criterion of truth the correspondence between thought and reality (adequatio 
intellectus et rei). Nominalism rejects the first two and only acknowledges 
universal concepts (or words) within the human mind – outside the human mind 
only uniquely individual entities exist. (Within nominalism a distinction is made 
between those nominalists who accept universal concepts: conceptualism. and 
the more extreme position which only accepts words.) In their ordinary 
understanding sets are universals and therefore they partake, in the words of 
Fraenkel et al. (1973:332), in “the well-known and amply discussed classical 
problem of the ontological status of the universals”. The three main traditional 
answers given to this problem, namely realism, nominalism and conceptualism, 
are related with their contemporary counter-parts known as platonism, neo-
nominalism, and neo-conceptualism (Fraenkel et al., 1973:332). Stegmüller 
explains the mathematical relevance of these different positions as follows: The 
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functional (modal) aspects. In his Principles of Philosophy Descartes 
explicitly says “that number and all universals are only modes of 
thought” (Part I, LVIII; see Descartes, 1965a:187). Hilbert (implicitly) 
continues this orientation when he argues that after we have 
established that reality is finite in two directions (the infinitely small 
and the infinitely large), the infinite may still have a justified place 
within our thinking!8 The implication is clear: “reality” is exhausted by 
entities (usually referred to as objects), modal (functional) properties 
are located in the realm of thought. 
Once this mistaken (nominalistic) view on the nature of mathematics 
has permeated philosophical discussions it is difficult to escape from 
its grip. Shapiro recently provides us with a typical formulation in his 
discussion of ideas of Quine when he refers to the “abstract, non-
spatiotemporal nature of mathematical objects” (Shapiro, 2005a:15). 
In an earlier work he mentions the challenge to realism that “needs 
an account of the relationship between the eternal, acausal, 
detached mathematical universe and the subject matter of science 
and everyday language – the material world” (Shapiro, 1997:4-5).  
The theory of modal aspects escapes from this way in which the 
problem is formulated by introducing the idea that the aspects of 
reality are really (ontic) aspects of reality. The argument followed in 
this article will be that the diverging standpoints within mathematics 
arise from alterative (and even mutually exclusive) views on the 
inter-connections between various ontically given aspects. 
4. The theory of modal aspects 
The theory of modal law-spheres first of all argues for the ontic 
status of the various modal aspects. Hao Wang remarks that Gödel 
is very “fond of an observation that he attributes to Bernays: …That 
the flower has five petals is as much part of objective reality as that 
its color is red” (Wang, 1988:202). The quantitative side (aspect) of 
things (entities) is not a product of thought – at most human 
                                                                                                              
three mentioned ontological positions, namely nominalism, conceptualism, and 
platonism, are mapped in terms of the quantitative categories “finite totality 
(Gesamtheit) – denumerable infinite totality – non-denumerable infinite totality” 
(Stegmüller, 1965:117-118). 
8 “Die Endlichkeit des Wirklichen haben wir nun in zwei Richtungen festgestellt: 
nach dem Unendlichkleinen und dem Unendlich großen. Dennoch könnte es 
sehr wohl zutreffen, daß das Unendliche in unserem Denken einen 
wohlberechtigten Platz hat und die Rolle eines unentbehrlichen Begriffes 
einnimmt” (Hilbert, 1925:165). 
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reflection can explore this given (functional) trait of reality by 
analysing what is entailed in the meaning of discrete quantity. Yet, in 
doing this (theoretical and non-theoretical) thought investigates the 
meaning of the quantitative aspect as it is given.  
• The formation of numerals 
Normally the first step is found in the formation of numerals (i.e. 
number symbols). Saying that numbers are created goes too far, 
because the quantitative mode of reality is pre-supposed in every 
construction of numerals (with their implied reference to numbers). 
The simplest act of counting already explores the ordinal meaning of 
this quantitative aspect of reality. Frege correctly remarks “that 
counting itself rests on a one-one correlation, namely between the 
number-words from 1 to n and the objects of the set” (quoted by 
Dummett, 1995:144). 
However, in the absence of a sound distinction between the 
dimension of concretely existing entities (normally largely identified 
with “physical”, “space-time existence” or material existence) and 
the dimension of functional modes (aspects) of ontic reality, which 
cannot be observed through sensory perception,9 mathematicians 
often struggle to account for the epistemic status of their “subject 
matter”.  
• The epistemic status of the “subject matter” of mathematics 
Perhaps the awareness of this need is best articulated in Wang’s 
discussion of Gödel’s thought. In his discussion of Gödel’s ideas 
regarding “mathematical objects” Wang mentions Gödel’s rejection 
of Kant’s conception regarding the “subjectivity” of mathematical 
objects. Gödel in contrast holds: “Rather they, too, may represent an 
aspect of objective reality, but, as opposed to the sensations, their 
presence in us may be due to another kind of relationship between 
ourselves and reality” (quoted by Wang, 1988:304, cf. p. 205). To 
this Wang adds his own support:  
 
                                      
9 Frege is convinced that numbers are not sensorily perceptible: “Sinnlich 
wahrnehmbar und räumlich sind weder diese noch die Brüche, noch die 
negativen, irrationalen und komplexen Zahlen; und wenn man wirklich nennt, 
was auf die Sinne wirkt" (Frege, 1884:97). Before him Kant said the same about 
time: “Nun kann die Zeit für sich nicht wahrgenommen werden” (Kant, 
1787:B225). 
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I am inclined to agree with Gödel, but do not know how to 
elaborate his assertions. I used to have trouble by the 
association of objective existence with having a fixed 
‘residence’ in spacetime. But I now feel that ‘an aspect of 
objective reality’ can exist (and be ‘perceived by semi-
perceptions’) without its occupying a location in spacetime in 
the way physical objects do (Wang, 1988:304; cf. Strauss, 
2003:69-72). 
Of course Wang could have referred to the important insights of 
Cassirer in this regard. Already in his article on Kant and modern 
mathematics (Cassirer, 1907), and particularly in his (mentioned) 
influential work of 1910, Substance and Function (see Cassirer, 
1953), Cassirer distinguishes between entities and functions. He 
clearly realises that the concrete many-sided existence of an 
individual thing is not exhausted by quantitative properties: “number 
is to be called universal not because it is contained as a fixed 
property in every individual, but because it represents a constant 
condition of judgment concerning every individual as an individual” 
(Cassirer, 1953:34). If we set aside the (neo-)Kantian undertones of 
this statement, Cassirer already saw something of what should be 
called the modal universality of the arithmetical aspect of reality.10
• The modal universality of the arithmetical aspect of reality 
The uniqueness of every aspect is guaranteed by its indefinable 
core (or nuclear) meaning (also designated as its meaning-nucleus). 
This core meaning qualifies all the analogical meaning-moments 
within a specific aspect. These analogical moments may refer 
backwards to aspects that are earlier within the ontic order of 
aspects (known as retrocipations) or forwards to ontically later 
aspects (known as anticipations).11 The meaning of an aspect 
                                      
10 The modal universality of an aspect entails that whatever exists within reality (in 
a concrete sense), in principle has a function within every modal aspect. 
11 Earlier and later are understood in the sense of cosmic time as it is called by 
Dooyeweerd. The aspects of reality are fitted in an inter-modal coherence of 
earlier and later. The most basic aspect is that of number (meaning-nucleus: 
discrete quantity), that is followed by the aspect of space (continuous 
extension), the kinematical aspect (core: constancy), the physical (change/ 
energy-operation), the biotic (life), the sensitive (feeling), the logical (analysis), 
the cultural-historical (formative control/power), the sign-mode (symbolical 
signification), and so on. Cosmic time has an order-side and a duration-side – 
we are acquainted with the numerical time-order of succession, the spatial time-
order of simultaneity, the kinematical time-order of uniform flow, the irreversible 
physical time-order, the biotical time-order of birth, growth, maturation, aging 
and dying (cf. Dooyeweerd, 1996-I; 30-32), and so on. 
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comes to expression in its coherence with other aspects (i.e. 
through its retrocipations and anticipations). And it is these 
retrocipatory analogies that are captured in the elementary basic 
concepts of a discipline. 
• The modal “seat” of particular terms 
The primary challenge to an analysis of the elementary (analogical) 
basic concepts of the various academic disciplines is given in the 
identification of the modal “home” or modal “seat” of particular 
terms.12
Within every aspect a difference exists between the order-side (also 
known as the law-side) and its correlate, the factual side (that which 
is subjected to the law-side in the sense that it is delimited and 
determined by the law-side). The numerical time-order of succession 
belongs to the law-side of the arithmetical aspect, and any ordered 
sequence of numbers appears at its factual side (think of the natural 
numbers in their normal succession). With the exception of the 
numerical aspect (which only has subject-subject relations), all the 
other aspects in addition also have subject-object relations at their 
factual side.13
5. Numerical and spatial terms 
It is intuitively clear that our awareness of succession and multiplicity 
(underlying the concept of ordinal numbers and the idea of 
mathematical induction) makes an appeal to the quantitative aspect 
of reality. These terms therefore have their modal “seat” (home) 
within the arithmetical aspect. 
Scholars working within different disciplines will always attempt to 
reduce terms that seem to be primitive to familiar and (presumably) 
more basic ones. If such an attempt, however, becomes circular, or 
even worse, contradictory, then the result may be that the primitive 
terms involved are truly irreducible. Phrased differently: an attempt 
to define what is indefinable may result in the kind of reduction 
                                      
12 For example, the one and the many are located within the quantitative aspect, 
continuity and extension within the spatial aspect, uniform flow and constancy 
within the kinematic aspect, and so on. 
13 The identifiability and distinguishability of something represents its latent logical 
object-function. When it is actually identified and distinguished by a thinking 
subject, this analytical object-function is disclosed or made patent. 
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generating antinomies.14 Sometimes the challenge is not to get out 
of the circle, but to get into it. 
The following cluster of terms transcends the confines of the 
numerical aspect as such: simultaneity (at once), completedness, 
wholeness (totality), and the whole-parts relation. 
Among 20th-century mathematicians the most prominent recognition 
of the spatial “home” of the terms wholeness and totality is found in 
the thought of Bernays. In the beginning of this article it has been 
noted that he recommends a distinction between the discrete and 
the continuous (Bernays, 1976:81). This conviction of Bernays is all 
the more significant in the light of the fact that he is fully acquainted 
with the arithmeticistic claims of modern analysis and set theory. He 
in fact radically questions the ideal of a complete arithmetization of 
mathematics. He unambiguously writes: 
We have to concede that the classical foundation of the theory 
of real numbers by Cantor and Dedekind does not constitute a 
complete arithmetization of mathematics. It is anyway very 
doubtful whether a complete arithmetization of the idea of the 
continuum could be fully justified. The idea of the continuum is 
after all originally a geometric idea (Bernays, 1976:187-188).15
This acknowledgement of the geometric “descent” of the idea of 
continuity also serves another important purpose when it comes to 
an understanding of diverging mathematical schools of thought 
because it opens up an insight into the irreducibility of succession 
and at once (simultaneity). This distinction is particularly helpful in 
explaining the difference between the so-called potential infinite and 
the so-called actual infinite. On the basis of this distinction between 
succession and at once the irreducibility of the notion of a totality 
also surfaces. Hilbert introduces the difference between the potential 
and the actual (or genuine) infinite by using the example of the 
“totality (italics – DFMS) of the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, ...” which is 
                                      
14 The classical example is Zeno’s attempt to define movement in static spatial 
terms (see the preceding article on primitive terms in mathematics – Strauss, 
2005a:515-534) – but doing that eliminated the meaning of motion. 
15 “Zuzugeben ist, daß die klassische Begründung der Theorie der reellen Zahlen 
durch Cantor und Dedekind keine restlose Arithmetisierung bildet. Jedoch, es 
ist sehr zweifelhaft, ob eine restlose Arithmetisierung der Idee des Kontinuums 
voll gerecht werden kann. Die Idee des Kontinuums ist, jedenfalls ursprünglich, 
eine geometrische Idee.” 
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viewed as a unity that is given at once (completed).16 According to 
Lorenzen (1968:97) understanding real numbers with the aid of the 
actual infinite cannot camouflage its ties with space (geometry): 
The overwhelming appearance of the actual infinite in modern 
mathematics is therefore only understandable if one includes 
geometry in one’s treatment. ... The actual infinite contained in 
the modern concept of real numbers still reveals its descent 
(Herkunft) from geometry. 
Lorenzen highlights the same assumption when he explains how 
real numbers are accounted for in terms of the actual infinite: 
One imagines much rather the real numbers as all at once 
actually present – even every real number is thus represented 
as an infinite decimal fraction, as if the infinitely many figures 
(Ziffern) existed all at once [‘alle auf einmal existierten’] 
(Lorenzen, 1972:163). 
These modes of speech highlight the inevitability of employing terms 
with a spatial descent even when the aim is to proceed in numerical 
terms only. Lorenzen correctly points out that arithmetic as such 
does not provide any motivation for the introduction of the actual 
infinite (Lorenzen, 1972:159). The fundamental difference between 
arithmetic and analysis in its classical form, according to Körner, 
follows from the fact that the central concept of analysis, namely that 
of a real number, is defined with the aid of actual infinite totalities 
(“aktual unendlicher Gesamtheiten” – Körner, 1972:134). Without 
this supposition Cantor’s proof on the non-denumerability of the real 
numbers collapses into denumerability. While rejecting the actual 
infinite, intuitionism interprets Cantor’s diagonal proof of the non-
denumerability of the real numbers in a constructive sense (cf. 
Heyting, 1971:40; Fraenkel et al., 1973:256, 272; Fraenkel, 1928: 
239, note 1). However, in order to reach the conclusion of non-
denumerability, every constructive interpretation fails – simply 
                                      
16 “Will man in Kürze die neue Auffassung des Unendlichen, der Cantor Eingang 
verschafft hat, charakterisieren, so könnte man wohl sagen: in der Analysis 
haben wir es nur mit dem Unendlichkleinen und dem Unendlichengroßen als 
Limesbegriff, als etwas Werdendem, Entstehendem, Erzeugtem, d.h., wie man 
sagt, mit dem potentiellen Unendlichen zu tun. Aber das eigentlich Unendliche 
selbst ist dies nicht. Dieses haben wir z.B., wenn wir die Gesamtheit der Zahlen 
1, 2, 3, 4, ... selbst als eine fertige Einheit betrachten oder die Punkte einer 
Strecke als eine Gesamtheit von Dingen ansehen, die fertig vorliegt. Diese Art 
des Unendlichen wird als aktual unendlich bezeichnet” (Hilbert, 1925:167). 
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because there is no constructive transition from the potential to the 
actual infinite (cf. Wolff, 1971). 
• Remark: Husserl’s Philosophie der Aritmetik17 
In 1887 Edmund Husserl completed his habilitation dedicated to a 
psychological analysis of the concept of number – followed in 1891 
by his extensive Philosophie der Arithmetik. In the latter work he 
connected the infinite both with the psychological nature of a 
collective synthesis (Husserl, 1970:64 ff.), and with the principle of 
succession (Husserl, 1970:220). He questioned the actual infinite in 
the light of the finiteness of arithmetic. He even planned a second 
volume of his Philosophie der Arithmetik, but eventually realised that 
he could not achieve his aim without using the actual infinite. L. Eley 
(in the Preface to Husserliana, Vol. XII) saw in this failure the reason 
why this second volume was never published. From the unpublished 
manuscripts it is nevertheless clear that Husserl did not succeed in 
giving a foundation to general arithmetic without the acceptance of 
the actual infinite (it indicates that he got stuck in classical analysis). 
In the light of our preceding considerations it therefore seems 
impossible to develop set theory without “borrowing” key-elements 
from our basic intuition of space, in particular the (order of) at once 
and its factual correlate, wholesness or totality.18
Of course Bernays did not have a theory of modal aspects at his 
disposal and therefore his approach did not have the possibility of 
explicitly articulating the intermodal connections between number 
and space. Nonetheless, formulations in his writings have been 
found approximating our idea of intermodal coherences. For 
example, instead of saying that a mathematical analysis of the 
meaning of number reveals an anticipation to the meaning of space, 
he explains that the idea of the continuum is a geometrical idea 
expressed by analysis in an arithmetical language.19
                                      
17 Edmund Husserl completed his habilitation in 1887 and published his study 
Philosophie der Aritmetik in 1891. 
18 Since spatial subjects are extended their multiple parts exist all at once. This 
multiplicity is at the factual side of the spatial aspect a retrocipation to the 
meaning of number – i.e. multiple parts analogically reflect the meaning of 
number within space. 
19 “Die Idee des Kontinuums ist, jedenfalls ursprünglich, eine geometrische Idee, 
welche durch die Analysis in arithmetischer Sprache ausgedrükt wird” (Bernays, 
1976:74). 
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6. A deepened understanding of infinity 
It has already been pointed out that the most primitive meaning of 
infinity relates to the arithmetical time-order of succession. This 
order of succession appears on the law-side of the numerical 
aspect. It determines every infinitely proceeding sequence of 
numbers as well as the different operations on the law-side of the 
arithmetical aspect – operations such as addition, multiplication, 
subtraction, division, as well as the principle of induction – that can 
be disclosed by (non-theoretical as well as theoretical) mathematical 
thinking. The expression potential infinite lacks an immediate 
intuitive clarity. Therefore a suitable phrase capable of capturing the 
meaning of this most basic kind of infinity is to call it the successive 
infinite. 
The Greeks already turned this kind of infinity infinite “inwards” for 
they discovered the infinite divisibility of continuity. In terms of the 
intermodal coherence between the aspects of number and space 
this infinite divisibility analogically (i.e. as a retrocipatory analogy) 
brings to expression the successive infinite on the law-side of the 
numerical aspect. The system of rational numbers (fractions), in 
turn, analogically (i.e. as an anticipatory analogy) reflects this infinite 
divisibility evinced at the factual side of the spatial aspect. 
Consequently, the rational numbers represent an anticipation to a 
retrocipation.20
When, under the guidance of our theoretical (i.e. modally 
abstracting) insight into the meaning of the spatial order of 
simultaneity, the original modal meaning of the numerical time-order 
is disclosed, we encounter the regulatively deepened anticipatory 
idea of actual or completed infinity. Directed in an anticipatory way 
by the spatial order of simultaneity, any sequence of numbers may 
then be considered as if its infinite number of elements are present 
as a whole (totality) all at once. 
In this context it is noteworthy that Hao Wang informs us that Kurt 
Gödel speaks of sets as being “quasi-spatial” and then adds that he 
is not sure whether Gödel would have said the “same thing of 
numbers” (Wang, 1988:202). This mode of speech is in line with our 
                                      
20 In passing we note that the numerical anticipation to a spatial retrocipation – 
revealed in the denseness of the rational numbers – is not sufficient to 
characterise any real number in a fully disclosed way. Intuitionism merely 
employs the semi-disclosed meaning of number (evinced in the system of 
rational numbers) in its characterisation of the “continuum”. 
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suggestion that the undefined term member of employed in 
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory actually gives shelter to the totality 
feature of continuity. The implication is that set theory (in an 
anticipating way) indeed depends on “something spatial”. 
This implication also confirms the unbreakable coherence between 
the law-side and the factual side of the numerical and the spatial 
aspects. The modal anticipation from the numerical time-order to the 
spatial time-order must therefore have its correlate at the factual 
side. At the factual side of the numerical aspect we find the 
sequence of natural numbers and integers (expressing the primitive 
meaning of numerical discreteness). Introducing the dense set of 
rational numbers manifests – as an anticipation to a retrocipation – 
the semi-disclosed meaning of number. 
When we employ the anticipation on the law-side of the numerical 
aspect to the law-side of the spatial aspect we encounter the 
intermodal foundation of the notion of actual infinity – although the 
basic intuitions at play suggest a more suitable designation for this 
kind of infinity. Before the above-mentioned alternative designation 
of the actual infinite is, however, explained in more detail, the as if 
nature of this deepened notion of infinity is in need of clarification.  
The anticipation from number to space on the law-side determines 
the multiplicity of natural numbers correlated with it – as an infinite 
totality. The same applies to integers and rational numbers for when 
the idea of the actual infinite is employed they can be considered as 
if they are present as completed (though infinite) wholes or totalities. 
 
• Remark: As if: The actual infinite as a regulative hypothesis 
Vaihinger developed a whole philosophy of the as if (Die Philosophie 
des Als Ob), in which he tries to demonstrate that certain fictions 
may be used positively by various academic disciplines in spite of 
the fact that in themselves they are considered to be internally 
antinomic. The infinite (whether infinitely large or infinitely small), is 
seen by Vaihinger as an example of a necessary and fruitful fiction 
(cf. Vaihinger, 1922:87 ff.; 530).  
 
Ludwig Fischer presents a more elaborate mathematical explanation 
of this notion of a fiction. In general he argues:  
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The definition of an irrational number by means of a 
formation rule always involves an ‘endless’, i.e. 
unfinished process. Supposing that the number is thus 
given, then one has to think of it as the completion 
(Vollendung) of this unfinished process. Only in this ... 
the internally antinomic (in sich widerspruchsvolle) and 
fictitious character of those numbers are already founded 
(Fischer, 1933:113-114)  
Without the aid of a prior analysis of the modal meaning of number 
and space, this conclusion is almost inevitable. Vaihinger and 
especially Fischer simply use the number concept of uncompleted 
infinity (the successive infinite) as a standard to judge the (onto-) 
logical status of the actual infinite. Surely, within the closed (not yet 
deepened) meaning of the numerical aspect, merely determined by 
the arithmetical time-order of unfinished succession, the notion of an 
actual infinite multiplicity is indeed self-contradictory. 
However, the idea of the actual infinite transcends the limits of this 
concept of the successive infinite since, in a regulative way, it refers 
to the core meaning of the spatial aspect. In an anticipatory sense 
the actual infinite hypothetically uses the spatial time-order of 
simultaneity, the all viewed as being present at once. 
Paul Lorenzen did understand something of this hypothetical spatial 
anticipation, for he remarks that the meaning of actual infinity as 
attached to the all shows the employment of a fiction – “the fiction, 
as if infinitely many numbers are given” (Lorenzen, 1952:593). In 
this case too, we see that the as if is ruled out, or at least 
disqualified as something fictitious, with an implicit appeal to the 
primitive meaning of number only. But as long as one sticks to the 
notion of a process, one implicitly merely applies the yardstick of the 
successive infinite in order to judge the actual infinite. 
Paul Bernays also acknowledged the essential hypothetical 
character of the opened-up meaning of number. But in the absence 
of an articulated analysis of the intermodal meaning coherence 
present between number and space he was unable to fully explore 
the meaning of this anticipatory hypothesis: 
The position at which we have arrived in connection with 
the theory of the infinite may be seen as a kind of the 
philosophy of the ‘as if’. Nevertheless, it distinguishes 
itself from the thus named philosophy of Vaihinger 
fundamentally by emphasizing the consistency and 
trustworthiness of this formation of ideas, where 
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Vaihinger considered the demand for consistency as a 
prejudice ... (Bernays, 1976:60). 
Although the deepened meaning of infinity is sometimes designated 
by the phrase completed infinity, this habit may be misleading. If 
succession and simultaneity are mutually irreducible, then the idea 
of an infinite totality cannot simply be seen as the completion of an 
infinite succession. Where Dummett refers to the classical treatment 
of infinite structures “as if they could be completed and then 
surveyed in their totality” he errs in equating this “infinite totality” with 
“the entire output of an infinite process” (Dummett, 1978:56). The 
idea of an infinite totality transcends the concept of the successive 
infinite. 
Cantor explicitly describes the actual infinite as a constant quantity, 
“firm and determined in all its parts” (Cantor, 1962:401). Throughout 
the history of Western philosophy and mathematics, all supporters of 
the idea of actual infinity implicitly or explicitly employed some or 
other form of the spatial order of simultaneity. What should have 
been used as an anticipatory regulative hypothesis (the idea of 
actual infinity), was often (since Augustine) reserved for God or an 
“eternal being”, accredited with the ability to oversee any infinite 
multiplicity all at once. 
This anticipatory regulative hypothesis of actual infinity does not 
cancel or eliminate the original modal meaning of number, but only 
deepens it under the guidance of theoretical thought. 
Perhaps also in this respect it would be helpful to introduce new 
terms for this well-known expression. Instead of speaking of the 
actual infinite we may prefer to talk of the at once infinite. An 
awareness of this terminology already surfaced in the disputes of 
the early 14th century regarding the supposed infinity of God.21
These new expressions relate directly to our basic numerical and 
spatial intuitions, viz. our awareness of succession and simultaneity 
– and their mutual irreducibility finds its foundation in the 
irreducibility of the aspects of number and space.22
                                      
21 Compare the expressions infinitum successivum and infinitum simultaneum 
(Maier, 1964:77-79). 
22 Dooyeweerd did not accept the idea of the at once infinite (actual infinity) owing 
to the fact that he was strongly influenced by the intuitionistic mathematicians 
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A truly deepened and disclosed account of the real numbers cannot 
be given without the support of the at once infinite. That this 
anticipatory coherence between number and space always 
functioned prominently in a deepened account of the real numbers, 
can be indicated from many sources. It will suffice to mention only 
one in this context. Before doing that we have to return briefly to the 
relationship between mathematics and logic. 
7. Mathematics and logic 
The logicistic attempt to deduce the meaning of number from the 
logical mode turned out to be circular in nature. If the meaning of 
analysis, however, presupposes the original quantitative meaning of 
unity and multiplicity, then it appears to be strange that we still have 
to concede that the discipline of mathematics is in need of a logical 
foundation. 
Cassirer implicitly approaches this problem in terms of the numerical 
analogy within the logical-analytical mode. His question is that it is 
not understandable why one only accepts logical identity and 
difference, which enter into the set concept as necessary elements, 
as such basic functions, but that one does not do the same with 
regard to numerical unity and difference as well. He claims that a 
truly satisfactory deduction of the one from the other is also not 
achieved by set theory, which entails a persistent suspicion that all 
similar attempts will continue to harbour a concealed epistemo-
logical circle.23
Yet, although it is true that the meaning of analysis presupposes the 
meaning of number, the (theoretical) analysis of the meaning of 
number remains a thought act that is qualified by the logical aspect. 
For this reason the discipline of logic occupies a foundational role 
with respect to all disciplines, including mathematics. 
                                                                                                              
Brouwer and Weyl in this regard (cf. Dooyeweerd, 1996-I:98-99, footnote 1; and 
Dooyeweerd, 1996-II:340, footnote 1). 
23 “In der Tat ist nicht einzusehen, warum man lediglich logische Identität und 
Verschiedenheit, die als notwendige Momente in den Mengenbegriff eingehen, 
als solche Urfunktionen gelten lassen und nicht auch die numerische einheit 
und den numersichen Unterschied von Anfang an in diesen Kreis aufnehmen 
will. Eine wirklich befriedigende Herleitung des einen aus dem anderen ist auch 
der mengentheoretischen Auffassung nicht gelungen, und der Verdacht eines 
versteckten erkenntnistheoretischen Zirkels blieb gegenüber allen Versuchen, 
die in dieser Richtung gemacht werden, immer bestehen” (Cassirer, 1957:73-
74). 
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These systematic distinctions pertaining to the uniqueness and 
mutual coherence of number and space will now be made fruitful for 
an understanding of arithmeticism and its shortcomings in modern 
mathematics. 
8. The circularity entailed in set-theoretical attempts to 
arithmetise continuity 
The nuclear meaning of space is indefinable. If one tries to define 
what is indefinable two equally objectionable options are open: 
• either one ends up with a tautology – coherence, being 
connected, and so on, are all synonymous terms for continuity; 
or, even worse, 
• one becomes a victim of (antinomic) reduction, i.e. one tries to 
reduce what is indefinable to something familiar but distinct from 
what is “defined”. 
While the idea is ancient, modern Cantorian set theory again has 
come up with the conviction that a spatial subject such as a 
particular line simply is an infinite (technically a non-denumerable 
infinite) set of points. 
If the points constituting the one-dimensional continuity of a line 
were themselves extended in any sense, the absurd implication that 
the continuity of every point is again constituted by “smaller points” 
than the first type would have to follow. But then each one of these 
“smaller points” of necessity would still be extended. Continuing this 
argument ad infinitum unmasks the absurd notion of ever “smaller” 
points, i.e. points with an ever-diminishing “size”. In reality such 
“diminishing” points do not at all refer to genuine points, since they 
simply reflect the primitive meaning of continuous extension. And we 
have noted that spatial continuity is infinitely divisible. Points like 
these entail the circularity that they are meant to build up space out 
of space. 
Anything that has factual spatial extension has a subject-function in 
the spatial aspect (such as a chair) or is a modal subject in space 
(such as a line, a surface, and so forth). Within space a point is, 
however, always dependent on a spatial subject for it is not 
extended.24 The length, surface or volume of a point is always zero 
                                      
24 We are now in a better position to explain the structural meaning of the three 
undefined terms introduced by Hilbert in his axiomatisation of geometry in 1899. 
650   Koers 70(4) 2005:631-659 
 D.F.M. Strauss 
– a point is simply not extended in any dimension. If the measure of 
one point is zero, then any number of points would still have a zero-
measure. Even a denumerable infinite set of points would never 
constitute any positive distance, since distance presupposes an 
extended subject. 
Grünbaum combined insights from the theory of point-sets (founded 
by Cantor) with general topological notions and with basic elements 
in modern dimension theory and measure theory in order to arrive at 
an apparently consistent conception of the extended linear 
continuum as an aggregate of unextended elements (see 
Grünbaum, 1952:288 ff.). From his analysis it is clear that he 
actually had “unextended unit point-sets” in mind and not simply a 
set of “unextended points” (Grünbaum, 1952:295). Initially he starts 
with a non-metrical topological description and then, later on, 
introduces a suitable metric normally used for Euclidean spaces 
(point-sets). The decisive presupposition of this analysis is given in 
the acceptance of the linear Cantorean continuum (arranged in an 
order of magnitude, i.e. the class of all real numbers) (cf. Grünbaum, 
1952:296). 
On the basis of certain distance axioms, the real function d(x,y) 
(called the distance of the points x,y which have the coordinates 
xi,yi) is used to define the length of a point-set constituting a finite 
interval on a straight line between two fixed points (the number of 
this distance is its length). For example, the length of a finite interval 
(a,b) is defined as the non-negative quantity b – a (disregarding the 
issue about the interval’s being closed, open, or half-open). In the 
limiting case of a = b, the interval is called degenerate with length 
zero (in this case we have a set containing a single point) (cf. 
Grünbaum, 1952:296). 
Furthermore, division as an operation is only defined on sets and not 
on their elements, implying that the divisibility of finite sets consists 
of the formation of proper non-empty subsets of these (surely, the 
degenerate interval is indivisible by virtue of its lack of a subset of 
the required kind) (Grünbaum, 1952:301). Finally, the following two 
                                                                                                              
These terms instantiate the spatial subject-object relation at the factual side of 
the spatial aspect. The term line represents the factual subject-side (factual, 
one-dimensional spatial extension); the term point represents the factual object-
side (always dependent upon an extended spatial subject); while the relation of 
dependence of the latter upon the former (i.e., the spatial subject-object 
relation) is represented by the relational term lies on. 
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propositions are asserted and are considered to the perfectly 
consistent: 
1. The line and intervals in it are infinitely divisible; and 
2. The line and intervals in it are each a union of indivisible 
degenerate intervals (Grünbaum, 1952:301). 
When Grünbaum’s analysis is met with our characterisation of the 
actual infinite (the at once infinite), the circularity of his whole 
approach is clearly seen. On the basis of the regulative hypothesis 
of the at once infinite, not only the set of real numbers but also the 
number of line segments having a common end point could be 
considered as non-denumerable infinite totalities. In the latter case 
(i.e. in the case of a group of line segments), we may identify, within 
the modal structure of space, a retrocipation to an anticipation (a 
mirror-image of the structure of the system of rational numbers). 
This retrocipation to an anticipation ultimately underlies Grünbaum’s 
statement that “the Cantorean line can be said to be already actually 
infinitely divided” (Grünbaum, 1952:300). 
The objection that any denumerable sum of degenerate intervals 
(with zero-length) must have a length of zero, does not invalidate 
Grünbaum’s claim that a positive interval is the union of a continuum 
of degenerate intervals, for in the latter case we are confronted with 
a non-denumerable number of degenerate intervals. Surely, if we 
cannot enumerate them, we cannot add them in order to form their 
sum. 
In order to understand the impasse entailed in Grünbaum’s account 
we only have to note the fact that non-denumerability presupposes 
the use of the at once infinite, as well as the fact that the at once 
infinite presupposes the spatial time-order of at once. As soon as 
this is realised, it becomes clear that Grünbaum’s argumentation is 
the victim of the following vicious circle. Spatial continuity could be 
reduced to number if and only if the at once infinite is used – but that 
presupposes what is supposed to be reduced, namely the 
(irreducibile) spatial time-order of at once. Space can therefore be 
reduced to number if and only if it is irreducible to number!25
                                      
25 Grünbaum had to concede: “The consistency of the metrical analysis which I 
have given depends crucially on the non-denumerability of the infinite point-sets 
constituting the intervals on the line” (Grünbaum, 1952:302). He, however, did 
not realise that one can only arrive at non-denumerability by accepting the at 
once infinite. and thus by presupposing the irreducibility of space. 
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Another consideration is quite enlightening in this context.26 Cantor 
refers to the relation that exists between his view of a perfect set 
and Dedekind’s cut theorem (Cantor, 1962:194). In a striking way 
Böhme then shows that Cantor’s definition of the continuum (as a 
perfectly coherent set) contains two stipulations that in fact conform 
to the two requirements of Aristotle’s definition of a continuum, 
namely coherence and a characteristic that ensures the existence of 
points of division for an infinity of them (see Böhme, 1966:309). By 
allowing only Dedekind cuts as divisions, Böhme justifies his 
statement by indicating that a Dedekind cut considers one point 
twice (the largest and the smallest ones are identical) and that 
Cantor’s notion of coherence reflects the Aristotelian view of the 
infinite divisibility of a continuum (see Böhme, 1966:309). 
What is remarkable is that the Cantor-Dedekind description of 
continuity is dependent upon the use of the actual infinite (the 
actually infinite set of real numbers), but nonetheless meets the two 
requirements for a continuum set by Aristotle, in spite of the fact that 
Aristotle explicitly rejects the actual infinite. He only recognises 
potential infinity.  
• Did Aristotle use the actual infinite implicitly 
The question thus remains: Did Aristotle use the actual infinite 
implicitly, or is the Cantor-Dedekind definition in the last instance not 
purely arithmetically founded? 
This seemingly perplexing situation is immediately clarified on the 
basis of our analysis of the intermodal coherence between number 
and space. We have established that the original spatial whole-parts 
relation indeed has its foundation in the numerical time-order of 
succession in that it displays the primitive meaning of infinity as 
endlessness. This in turn highlights the infinite or endless divisibility 
of spatial continuity.27 If one restricts oneself to this original meaning 
of the spatial aspect (without, in addition, considering the opened-up 
meaning of the foundational aspect of number), as Aristotle implicitly 
did (which is understandable in the light of the geometrisation of 
Greek mathematics), then no meaning could be attached to the 
notion of actual infinity. This explains the relative correctness 
present in the claim (put forward by Aristotle, Kant and many others 
                                      
26 A more extensive analysis of this insight is found in Strauss (2002). 
27 This feature manifests the retrocipation at the factual side of the spatial aspect 
to the law-side of the numerical aspect. 
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in the history of philosophy and mathematics) that a line is not 
divided in the sense of the actual infinite (at once infinite), but only 
divisible in the sense of the potential infinite (the successive infinite). 
It is relatively correct, because the foundational meaning of number 
(analogically reflected in the multiplicity of successive spatial 
divisions) is not itself as yet opened up by the anticipatory 
hypothesis of the at once infinite (directing the meaning of number, 
under the guidance of theoretical thinking, to the modal meaning of 
space). 
This is, however, exactly what Cantor did – he effectively used this 
anticipatory meaning of number in his description of a perfectly 
coherent set of real numbers (taken in their linear order), without 
realising, however, that implicitly his use of the at once infinite 
presupposes the primitive and irreducible spatial order of 
simultaneity. But given this disclosed approach, it is no longer 
possible to argue against the actually infinite dividedness of a line on 
the basis of its infinite divisibility. The notion of endless divisibility, 
employing the number-concept of the successive infinite, may be 
deepened with the foundational aid of the opened-up numerical use 
of the number-idea of actual infinity. Consequently, the diverging 
approaches to continuity present in the thought of Aristotle and 
Cantor – in spite of their formal agreement concerning the two 
mentioned criteria for continuity – may be summarised as follows: 
 
Aristotle and Cantor’s characterisation of continuity 
Both Aristotle and Cantor characterise continuity, but each one 
chooses his own view-point – Aristotle’s angle of approach is 
the spatial aspect (which does not necessarily need the at once 
infinite), whereas Cantor’s perspective uses the numerical 
anticipation to space (an approach which does need the at once 
infinite). 
Intuitionistic mathematics is much closer to Aristotle because it 
approximates real numbers by means of successive rational 
intervals – compare Brouwer’s notion of choice sequences and 
successive, partially overlapping parts (Fraenkel et al., 1973:256). 
• The irreducibility of the modal meaning of space to that of 
number 
The preceding analysis enables us to claim that the irreducibility of 
the spatial time-order of simultaneity to the numerical time-order of 
succession ultimately rests on the irreducibility of the modal 
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meaning of space to that of number. From this claim it directly 
follows that the spatial whole-parts relation, determined by the 
spatial order of simultaneity, is irreducible as well, and it also 
explains why the typical totality character of the continuum renders 
the attempted purely arithmetical “definition” of continuity circular. 
Our argumentation therefore has indicated that the modal meaning 
of space, qualified by the primitive meaning-nucleus of continuous 
extension,28 not only implies that this meaning-nucleus of space is 
irreducible to number, but also that the spatial order of simultaneity 
on the law-side, as well as the whole-parts relation at the factual 
side of the spatial aspect, ultimately are irreducible. 
Although he did not pay attention to the law-side of the spatial 
aspect (obviously because he did not dispose over an articulated 
meaning-analysis of the structure of number and space), we have 
noted in the preceding article (Strauss, 2005a:515-534; see note 19) 
that Paul Bernays does appreciate the irreducibility of the spatial 
whole-parts relation (the totality feature of spatial continuity) 
(Bernays, 1976:74). 
The property of being a totality “undeniably belongs to the geometric 
idea of the continuum. And it is this characteristic which resists a 
complete arithmetization of the continuum”.29
Bernays’s deeply felt reaction against the mistaken and one-sided 
nature of modern arithmeticism is best seen from his following 
words: 
The arithmetizing monism in mathematics is an arbitrary thesis. 
The claim that the field of investigation of mathematics purely 
emerges from the representation of number is not at all shown. 
Much rather, it is presumably the case that concepts such as a 
continuous curve and an area, and in particular the concepts 
used in topology, are not reducible to notions of number 
(Zahlvorstellungen) (Bernays, 1976:188). 
                                      
28 Expressing itself on the law-side as an order of simultaneity and at the factual 
side as dimensionally determined extension – with or without a defined metric. 
29 “Und es ist auch dieser Charakter, der einer vollkommenen Arithmetisierung 
des Kontinuums entgegensteht” (Bernays, 1976:74). 
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9. Concluding assessment 
Although continuity belongs to the core meaning of the spatial 
aspect, and in this role qualifies the retrocipatory analogies to 
number within this aspect, the meaning of spatial continuity 
expresses itself in its coherence with the (foundational) meaning of 
number. 
The divergence of intuitionistic and (axiomatic-) formalistic 
mathematics briefly explained at the beginning of this article, 
ultimately boils down to alternative philosophical views of the 
relationship between number and space.  
 
• Intuitionistic mathematics restricts itself to the use of the 
successive infinite, and in doing it at most produced a semi-
disclosed analysis of the real numbers.  
• Axiomatic formalism, in contrast, did take the step to explore and 
employ the at once infinite, but did not realise that this move 
presupposes the irreducibility of the spatial time-order of at once. 
At the same time this analysis makes it possible for us to defend the 
thesis that modern mathematical set theory ought to be 
characterised as a spatially deepened theory of number. Bernays 
(1976:74) phrased this (above-mentioned) characterisation as 
follows: “The idea of the continuum is a geometrical idea which 
analysis expresses in terms of arithmetic”.30
Not realising this, the spatially deepened nature of set theory causes 
the vicious circle entailed in all attempts to argue for a complete 
reduction of space to number on the basis of a theory employing the 
numerical anticipation to space (i.e. by accepting the at once 
infinite). In opposition to the attempt of Greek mathematics to reduce 
number to space and the modern pursuit to arithmetise space, we 
have now articulated in more detail the alternative view that 
acknowledges the uniqueness and mutual coherence of number and 
space. 
                                      
30  A topological description of continuity abstracts from any given metric. 
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